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The Lutheran tradition offers a distinct witness to American 
lawmakers as they attempt to respond to changing social mores about 
marriage, family structure, and divorce. Because Lutherans respect both the 
state and the family as critical creative orderings of God,1 Lutherans can 
effectively engage the state about the ways in which family law can support 
or damage family structures and support or retard human flourishing.  
                                                          
*Professor of Law, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, and former editor, The Journal of Law 
and Religion. A version of this paper was delivered at the Association of Teaching 
Theologians of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America and the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in Canada on August 1, 2016.  
1 Lutherans describe this concept variously as the orders of creation, orders of preservation, 
and Creator’s Ordainings (Edward Schroeder’s term). See Ed Schroeder, Homosexuality and 
Reformation Theology, CROSSINGS, https://www.crossings.org/homosexuality-and-
reformation-theology/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2019). 




Building heavily on the Reformation history of John Witte, Jr., this Article 
will briefly trace the trajectory of the law of the family, most particularly, the 
law of marriage and divorce from the Reformation and consider its 
application to modern concerns.2   
Recent American family law jurisprudence has produced a spectrum 
of views about the nature of the legal family and standards that should govern 
it. On one end of this spectrum, some scholars argue for a return to a family 
law that reinforces the legal privileging of the nuclear family of husband, 
wife, and children, citing natural law or the essential nature of the human 
community of marriage as based on gender differentiation to explain why this 
is the most effective family form.3  On the other end of the spectrum, some 
family law scholars argue that the mother-child or caretaker-dependent 
relationship is the core relationship around which family law should be built, 
while other relationships should be relegated to governance by religious or 
cultural communities or managed by spousal contracts.4 
 Many have also noted, some with dismay, contemporary trends in 
western nations to uncouple marriage from our concept of the family, though 
it is important to understand that this is not a novel moment in history or a 
cultural innovation. Legal historian Mary Ann Glendon reminds us that while 
family formation and marriage preceded modern legal institutions, “marriage, 
                                                          
2 See generally JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION 
AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION (1st ed. 1997). Admittedly, this story is necessarily 
oversimplified, because each state’s family law has its own idiosyncrasies, developed as 
legislatures and courts have responded to stories of family conflict and injustice. 
3 One of the most interesting examples of an argument for traditional marriage is made by 
Lynn D. Wardle. See Lynn D. Wardle, The Boundaries of Belonging: Allegiance, Purpose, 
and the Definition of Marriage, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 287, 287–88 (2011). In his article, he 
argues that given the deep human need for belonging, and the necessity of boundaries to 
confine human community to a form that meets that need, particularly the community of 
marriage, the protection and privileging of traditional heterosexual marriage is necessary to 
protect the valuing of humans’ opportunity to experience such belonging. Id. at 288–91. 
4 See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 
134–38 (2004) (concluding that marriage should be abolished as a legal category and its 
perquisites and privileges transferred to the caretaker-dependent relationship).  




. . . in the sense of a highly individualized heterosexual relation, is said to be 
barely visible in some of the simplest human societies, and in others it is 
viewed as irrelevant to family formation.”5 
I. THE CATHOLIC MODEL OF MARRIAGE 
Indeed, the western law of marriage and divorce has been constantly 
changing from its first stirrings. Professor Witte has traced three major 
historical moments in the Western Christian history of marriage law.6 Witte 
describes the first movement toward the Catholic model of marriage, which 
came to flower in the mid-12th century.7 The Catholic model stresses the 
natural, contractual, and sacramental dimensions of marriage. As a “natural 
association,” Catholic theologians explained, marriage was “created by God 
to enable man and woman to ‘be fruitful and multiply’ and to raise children 
in the service and love of God.”8 In this dimension, marriage also served as 
a remedy for lust and a channel for natural passions. In the second contractual 
dimension of marriage, the marital parties created “a contractual unit, formed 
by the mutual consent of the parties” who thereby agreed to “a lifelong 
relation of love, service, and devotion to each other.”9 Third, Catholics held 
that marriage was a sacrament, symbolizing the “eternal union between 
Christ and His church,” and bestowing “sanctifying grace to the couple, the 
church, and the community.”10 
II. REFORMATION MODELS OF MARRIAGE 
The 16th century, the Reformation era, provided the second important 
movement in Christendom in the development of family law. Witte traces 
                                                          
5 MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 5 (1989). 
6 WITTE, supra note 2, at 3. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 3–4. 
10Id. at 4. 




three streams of marriage law that the Reformation gave rise to, streams 
which all rejected the sacramental understanding of marriage and the 
preference for celibacy over marriage but developed distinctive theologies to 
understand the nature of marriage and the way in which law should be shaped 
as a result.11 Calvinists understood marriage as a sacred covenant of the 
couple’s consent, ordained by God to be a lifelong union; God was a party to 
the agreement, and in some sense, so were the couple’s family, witnesses, 
pastor, and magistrate.12 Anglicans analogized marriage to a political 
commonwealth, holding “that it served and symbolized the common good of 
the couple, the children, the church, and the state all at once,” thus 
metaphorically rationalizing the headship of the husband over the wife and 
parents over children.13 Lutherans developed their own “social model of 
marriage,” on which this brief Article is focused.14  
 Finally, Witte describes an Enlightenment model that developed 
between the 18th and late 20th centuries, which was based on a “voluntary 
bargain struck between two parties who wanted to come together into an 
intimate association.”15 This contractual approach imposed few social 
constraints or implications on the parties other than those governing other 
                                                          
11 See generally id. 
12 Id. at 7. In the covenantal model, the marriage ceremony was an agreement between the 
spouses, God as a third-party witness, the couple’s parents as “God’s lieutenants for 
children” and “two witnesses, as God’s priests to their peers.” Id. Both the minister, who 
blessed and admonished the couple; and the magistrate, who registered and protected the 
marriage, also were “parties” to this marriage. Id. Calvinist theory suggested that there were 
two tracks of moral norms, one for persons of all faiths and none, to be enforced by the state; 
and a “higher morality of aspiration demanded of believers in order to reflect their faith,” to 
be taught by the church. Id. Witte argues that Calvinists took the Lutheran social model and 
added a spiritual dimension to earthly marriage, one that permitted only innocent spouses to 
dissolve the covenant. Id. at 7–8. 
13 Id. at 9. Although Anglicans embraced the covenantal aspect of marriage, the essential 
calling of the family was to foster love, service and security, and teach the entire 
commonwealth essential Christian norms. Id. at 8–9. 
14 Id. at 5–6. 
15 Id. at 10. 




contractual endeavors, e.g., “respect for the life, liberty and property interests 
of other parties, and compliance with general standards of health, safety and 
welfare in the community.”16  
III. THE LUTHERAN SOCIAL ESTATE 
The Lutheran “social estate” of marriage law, developed between 
1523 and 1559 in Germany,17 is familiar to American Lutherans. As one of 
several of God’s creative orderings, and following two-kingdoms theology, 
marriage is not a sacrament, though for Luther, the church has an important 
role in blessing, instructing, and supporting the family.18 Rather, the law of 
the family, including marriage and divorce, is a matter for state officials to 
construct to serve social values and human dignity for Christians and non-
Christians alike.19   
Witte notes that this Lutheran social model had a significant impact 
on the law of marriage and divorce.20 In terms of entrance into marriage, the 
Reformers eliminated many sacramentally-based restrictions imposed by the 
Catholic Church. Catholic prohibitions against priests and nuns marrying 
others, and remarriage after divorce, are well known. However, at the time of 
the Reformation, Catholic doctrine also restricted many other marriages 
because of its sacramental nature. It prohibited marriages between a 
godparent and godchild, blood relatives to the fourth degree, Christians and 
non-Christians, persons related loosely by adoption, murderers and sexual 
criminals, and marriages of those who did public penance for mortal sins, all 
constraints that the Reformation narrowed or abandoned.21 Reformers 
continued to prohibit bigamy and polygamy, and permitted annulments 
                                                          
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 55. 
18 Id. at 51, 53. 
19 Id. at 5–6. 
20 Id. at 64–65. 
21 Id.  




because of physical impediments such as impotence or the lack of real 
consent by one party in cases of coercion, fraud, or even a mistake about one 
spouse’s virginity.22 
The Reformers also loosened sacramentally based Catholic 
restrictions on divorce. Reformers saw divorce, as instituted by Moses and 
Christ, as “a result of sin and a remedy against greater sin” and understood 
that over time, God had revealed new proper grounds for divorce.23 Because 
the Protestants believed that the law of marriage and divorce was not divinely 
pronounced but humanly constructed according to the best human reason, 
post-Reformation family laws reflected widely disparate views about 
appropriate grounds for divorce. A few Reformers favored legal divorce only 
for adultery, while others permitted it for additional grounds; among them 
willful desertion, refusal to have sex, impotence, incompatibility, threats of 
death, deception, one spouse’s felonies, defamation of or conspiracies against 
spouses, and even “frequenting of ‘public games’ or places of ill repute.”24 
Though Luther found himself among the more conservative in these 
discussions, even he acknowledged that marital brokenness and 
irreconcilable separation could be grounds for divorce, once noting that:   
Certain queer, stubborn, and obstinate people, who have no 
capacity for toleration and are not suited for married life at all, 
should be permitted to get a divorce. Since people are as evil 
as they are, any other way of governing is impossible. 
Frequently, something must be tolerated, even though it is not 
a good thing to do, to prevent something even worse from 
happening.25 
While the Reformers did not shy away from acknowledging pedagogical 
                                                          
22 Id. at 62–63. 
23 Id. at 68.  
24 Id. at 68–69. 
25 Id. at 67 (quoting JAROSLAV PELIKAN AND HELMUT T. LEHMAN, trans., 21 LUTHER’S 
WORKS 94 (1955–86)). 




functions of marriage,26 Reformation marriage law focused on the role of 
marriage as a public institution, like the Church and the state. Consistent with 
that vision, Lutherans laid uncommon stress on the public nature of marriage 
formation. They particularly pressed the importance of young people seeking 
their parents’ help in finding a spouse and their approval of a marriage, the 
desirability of having witnesses to attest to the marriage, and the need to 
memorialize the marriage before the entire community through a public 
registry.27 As a public institution governed by secular public norms, marriage 
law imposed community responsibilities for the welfare of the couple and the 
family and, conversely, family responsibilities for the community. One of 
those responsibilities of married couples and their families, which society 
often does not think about as an aspect of modern marriage, was the family’s 
calling to “take in and care for wayfarers, widows, and destitute persons” who 
were formerly cared for by the Church.28  
IV. MODERN TRANSFORMATIONS OF MARRIAGE LAW 
While Witte, Glendon, and others have traced the dynamism of family 
law over these medieval and early modern centuries, the transformation of 
family law has not stopped in our time, even though modern American law 
still bears distinct traces of these Reformation changes. First, in the U.S. and 
modern western societies, marriage is considered a social institution 
                                                          
26 For the Reformers, marriage served the theological function of revealing his sins to the 
sinner, including lust. WITTE, supra note 2, at 5. They also taught “the virtues of love, patient 
cooperation and altruism” to marital partners, and “Christian values, morals and mores” to 
children and others. Id. at 5, 49, 52. 
27 To be sure, Catholic tradition had been moving in this more public direction, albeit slowly. 
Prof. Glendon notes that the Church’s position until the 16th century was that the consent of 
the parties alone constituted a valid marriage. Though priestly blessings on marriage were 
recorded as early as the second century, the custom of exchanging marriage vows before the 
church door only arose during the Middle Ages, then later a public ceremony was prescribed 
but not enforced. Finally, with the Council of Trent (1653), the Church required the marriage 
ceremony to before a priest for the marriage to be valid. GLENDON, supra note 5, at 25. 
28 WITTE, supra note 2, at 49.  




governed by the state for practical social ends. Given that marriage plays a 
vital role in organizing and sustaining social life, core Reformation legal 
impediments to marriage remain much the same. The law of most American 
states still voids, or makes voidable, bigamy and polygamy, incestuous 
marriages, or those among couples within a prescribed degree of 
consanguinity, marriages of young children, and marriages contracted by 
those without the capacity to consent or through fraud or duress.29 Some 
states still require tests for diseases like syphilis or AIDS, though they are not 
usually absolute bars to marriage or grounds for annulment as they were in 
Reformation days, but rather used to inform marriage partners of what 
diseases the couple may carry.30  
Second, 20th and 21st century marriage laws have largely adopted the 
practices that reinforce the view that marriage is a social institution, requiring 
parents to consent to the marriage of older minors, solemnization of the 
marriage by a state-approved clergyperson or public official, official 
witnesses to the marriage, and public permission and affirmation of a 
marriage through requirements of a marriage license and registration.31 The 
American law of divorce has also recognized the public character of 
                                                          
29 Most American states have a range of ages at which marriage is absolutely prohibited, 
permitted with the approval of a parent, and permitted without anyone’s consent (which is 
normally age 18). See IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL, FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 
(5th ed., 2010). States also employ a range of family relationships which prohibit the parties 
from marrying. For example, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, promulgated by the 
American Law Institute, prohibits ancestor-descendant, sibling, and uncle or aunt and 
niece/nephew marriages (except where tribal custom permits). J. THOMAS OLDHAM, FAMILY 
LAW: UNIFORM LAWS AFFECTING THE FAMILY 540 (2012). Bigamous and polygamous 
marriages are also prohibited in the Uniform Act. Id. 
30 DOUGLAS J. ABRAMS, ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 167 (3d ed. 2012); see also 
ELLMAN, supra note 29, at 122 (noting that most states require a physical examination which 
may be for venereal disease, tuberculosis, rubella, sickle cell anemia, and mental 
incompetence, and most recently, some states required AIDS testing). In some states, the 
results of some of these tests can be bars to marriage but not all. 
31 Model Marriage and Divorce Act, OLDHAM, supra note 29, at 540–42 (describing 
formalities of marriage license, marriage certificate, solemnization and registration). 




marriage.32 Until the 1960s, divorce was limited to those who could prove 
certain grounds to the satisfaction of judges required to issue formal orders 
of divorce as they do today.33 Originally, statutory grounds included adultery, 
desertion, and sometimes physical cruelty. In the early 20th century, many 
states expanded that list to include grounds such as mental cruelty, drug 
addiction, or alcoholism.34  
Until recent decades, there were also families in the shadows of the 
law; families not formed by a legal marriage of a man and woman. They 
included children out of wedlock and their parents; men and women who 
lived together without marrying; and gay and lesbian couples whose 
relationship could not be admitted socially, much less receive legal protection 
from the state. Indeed, an infinite variety of family forms—grandparents 
raising their grandchildren, adult children living with their parents, unmarried 
sisters and brothers living together, and single parents who moved their 
families in together to save money—were not legally recognized or protected 
as families. Gradually, the law developed or used existing legal forms to 
provide some protection for these non-marital families. For example, non-
parental relatives taking in children or disabled adults could obtain legal 
guardianships and gay and lesbian couples could use powers of attorney or 
wills to create rights similar to those that spouses have. However, these work-
arounds were often complicated, time-consuming, and expensive to put in 
place.  
Except for a handful of American states that have held on to common 
                                                          
32 WITTE, supra note 2, at 211. 
33 Id. 
34 See id. at 209 (noting that the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act eliminated impediments 
such as inebriation, sterility, frigidity and incapacity, while making marriage voidable if 
parties could not contract due to alcohol or drugs, disability, or duress or fraud); ELLLMAN, 
supra note 29, at 259 (noting state-by-state variation in fault-based grounds from adultery 
and desertion to physical and mental cruelty). 




law marriage since its heyday in the late 19th century, adults in these non-
marital families were, for the most part, unbeholden to each other legally, no 
matter how many years they had functioned as a de facto family. Until the 
last few decades, even explicit agreements made by unmarried couples to 
support each other or share assets were often unenforceable because these 
relationships were considered “meretricious,” i.e., linking money to sexual 
intercourse.35 In rare cases, the courts would step in if one partner had taken 
financial advantage of the other through provably fraudulent promises of 
property or support that induced the other person to give up (usually) her life 
prospects to provide care or services for that partner.36 Otherwise, those who 
lived as if they were families without marriage, loving and caring for others 
in their household, but generally had no legal protection if the party with 
income or assets chose to abandon them or died without a will naming their 
partner as beneficiary. 
  For most of the 20th century, states had mechanisms for protecting 
non-marital children, but they were tedious, clumsy, and often disrespectful 
to families. Just an example, the paternity cases I handled as a Legal Aid 
lawyer in the late 1970s and early 1980s required a mother to file a lawsuit 
against the father of the child. Then she had to prove by credible testimony 
or a relatively unsophisticated blood test that the defendant was the child’s 
father.37 If the blood test was not conclusive, as it often was not, women 
would have to undergo a barrage of demeaning cross-examination questions 
from the father’s attorney designed to show that the mother was sleeping 
around and could have become pregnant by any number of men.  
                                                          
35 See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 411 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing Sullivan v. 
Rooney, 533 N.E.2d 1372 (Mass. 1989)). 
36 Id. at 413. 
37 The HLA test, the predecessor to today’s DNA testing, was expensive, and thus, not widely 
available. See generally How DNA Testing Has Changed, DNA DIAGNOSTICS CENTER (Sep. 
2019), https://dnacenter.com/blog/dna-testing-changed/. 




Women who needed to receive welfare for their children could not 
avoid this punishing experience because the federal government gave them 
no choice. Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits were 
conditioned on the mother’s cooperation in establishing paternity and support 
so the state could ensure that child support was flowing to reimburse the state 
for welfare benefits. Only if the mother could prove some serious harm to 
herself or her child was she exempt from this duty of cooperation, even if she 
did not think it would be in her child’s or her best interest to maintain contact, 
since visitation rights almost always accompanied a paternity determination. 
Even worse, actual child support orders were measly, resting on outdated 
notions of the cost of supporting a child. Even when court support orders 
were entered on behalf of children, non-marital fathers found any number of 
ways to evade paying them, some even quitting their jobs to spite their former 
lovers or moving to another state out of the reach of the law. 
 True to its ever-evolving nature, over the past 30 or 40 years, family 
law in the United States has been undergoing even more transformation. 
When I was a Legal Services attorney, American family law had just settled 
into no-fault divorce as the norm, which itself was considered a sea-change 
for marriage. No-fault divorce became popular in part because one party to a 
marriage could exit without having to prove the other guilty of serious 
wrongdoing, such as adultery or physical cruelty, a process that made 
divorces difficult and encouraged courts to create artifices to permit warring 
couples to divorce.38 No-fault divorce also put an end to collusive divorces 
in which both spouses who wanted out of the marriage would jointly 
manufacture evidence giving rise to grounds for divorce. As an example, in 
New York, women could be “hired out” to be the supposed “other woman” 
                                                          
38 See generally ABRAMS, supra note 30, at 425 (noting that no-fault divorce was swiftly 
adopted in the decade after 1969 because fault-based divorce had become known, because 
of its “prying, perjury and collusion, as corrupt and inhumane”). 




in a fraudulent adultery. A few staged racy photos later, the colluding 
husband and wife could receive permission from the state to end their 
marriage.39 With the advent of no-fault divorce, feminists and others rejoiced 
that they could leave marriages where their husbands were emotionally and 
physically abusive, spendthrifts, or neglected their families, but not quite 
enough to justify the limited fault grounds provided by the state. The 
combination of no-fault divorce and constitutionally protected access to 
contraceptives and abortion after Roe v. Wade gave American women more 
choices about both their financial circumstances and their personal happiness.  
 A second major consequence of no-fault divorce, however, was not 
so liberating. With no-fault divorce came the trend in many states of 
abolishing permanent alimony which supported stay-at-home wives and 
mothers, as well as those who worked for pay in part-time or low-paying 
jobs.40 In theory, now that women were believed to be autonomous and on 
equal footing with men, many no-fault advocates argued that it was better to 
wind up all economic relationships between husbands and wives by splitting 
property assets once and for all at the time of divorce; other than child support 
which continued until the children of the marriage reached 18.41 For women 
in marriages with large assets who had aggressive divorce lawyers, this may 
not have resulted in dramatic harm. For an average middle- or working-class 
                                                          
39 See ELLMAN, supra note 29, at 260–62 (citing Note, Collusive and Consensual Divorce 
and the New York Anomaly, 36 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1121–33 (1936)); LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 434–38 (2002). Ellman notes that 
if the parties’ collusion was discovered, they would be denied a divorce. ELLMAN, supra note 
29, at 260–61. 
40 ABRAMS, supra note 30, at 552–54 (citing Katharine K. Baker, Homogeneous Rules for 
Heterogeneous Families: The Standardization of Family Law When There is No Standard 
Family, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 319 (2012)). Family law historians also note that permanent 
alimony substituted for dower, as well as accounting for fault in destroying the marriage, 
since only innocent spouses were entitled to it. Id. at 545 (citing Mary Kay Kisthardt, Re-
Thinking Alimony: the AAML’s Considerations for Calculating Alimony, Spousal Support or 
Maintenance, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 61, 62, 65–73 (2008)). 
41 See generally WITTE, supra note 2, at 212–13; ABRAMS, supra note 30, at 552.  




mother of this era, when such families had little by way of accumulated assets 
except a house and car, and the husband brought home the paycheck, this 
innovation was disastrous. Saddled with the children and often the debts of 
the family, with few prospects for well-paying jobs, especially with child care 
responsibilities, and often insufficient child support orders that fathers could 
easily evade paying, single mothers struggled to survive. 
 Today’s American family law looks much different than it did with 
these mid-20th century innovations, even though the nuclear family has held 
on as the paradigm for legal regulation of the family. For marital families, 
states have recognized that simply splitting up assets in a divorce by awarding 
property to the person who had the means to purchase it and to take title in 
his name, or even splitting accumulated property 50-50 with minimal child 
support payments, often results in a windfall to the husband who has most of 
the family wealth and earning opportunities. Lawmakers have devised ever 
more complex sets of criteria for splitting up the property of the marriage. As 
just one example, even where permanent alimony has largely disappeared, 
some states grant a period of rehabilitative alimony or maintenance to permit 
an unemployed or underemployed wife to get education or training for a 
decent-paying job.42   
For non-marital families, courts have been slowly recognizing claims 
of partners against each other where there were promises of support or the 
couple acted like partners. The case widely credited for changes in this area 
is Marvin v. Marvin, in which actor Lee Marvin’s live-in girlfriend Michelle 
sued him for what was later termed “palimony” based on his alleged promise 
that Lee would share his assets with Michelle if she would perform the roles 
                                                          
42 For a discussion of the title and equitable division approaches to property division, and the 
many factors the courts take into consideration in determining what division is equitable, see 
ELLMAN, supra note 29, at 320–22, 336–42 




of companion, homemaker, housekeeper, cook, and hostess.43 Despite the 
fact that some states followed Marvin to create remedies for breakups in non-
marital relationships, other states, like Minnesota, hold onto the rule that non-
marital partners must produce written contracts of support to hold their 
partners liable for property or support upon dissolution of the relationship.44   
      More dramatically, states have recognized the necessity of ensuring that 
children receive proper support when their parents do not live together as a 
couple sharing expenses and income. Many have simplified the process of 
identifying paternity, allowing fathers to acknowledge paternity immediately 
when a baby is born.45 Virtually all states have established uniform child 
support guidelines at more realistic levels; many of these schemes take into 
consideration the incomes of both parties, not just the custodial parent.46 
States and the federal government have devised a panoply of methods of 
collecting support from deadbeat parents, including wage garnishments; tax 
refund captures; refusal of passports to obligors with $2500 in delinquent 
support; revocation of driver’s, hunting, and other licenses; and even the 
threat of prison to compel compliance.47 
 Finally, and most recently, with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, the right of gay and lesbian couples to marry has been 
recognized.48 Prior to Obergefell, some states reacted to the growing clamor 
                                                          
43 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976); SINGER, supra note 35, at 411–12 
(describing the cases that gave rise to these changes and theories that give rise to legal 
responsibility to share assets or support). 
44 MARTIN L. SWADEN & LINDA A. OLUP, 14 FAMILY LAW 12–13 (2008). 
45 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 302 (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 
2017); OLDHAM, supra note 29, at 604. The Act also presumes paternity if the child is born 
shortly after divorce or the father has lived with the child for at least his first two years and 
held the child out as his own. Id. at 603.  
46 ELLLMAN, supra note 29, at 518–20 (noting, however, the wide disparities in support 
obligations between states). 
47 Id. at 580–89; see also Tonya L. Brito, Fathers Behind Bars: Rethinking Child Support 
Policy Toward Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers and Their Families, 15 J. GENDER RACE 
& JUST. 617, 650 (2012). 
48 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584 (2015). 




for same-sex marriage by enacting civil union or domestic partnership 
statutes that would grant many or all of the legal protections of marriage to 
cohabiting couples who chose to sign legal registries indicating their intent 
to enter these legal relationships.49 After Obergefell, whether such statutes 
will survive for couples who do not want to get married but who still want 
some of the legal protections of marriage is still unclear. 
 Thus, Professor Glendon’s observation about the thin thread between 
marriage and family applies even in the modern nuclear family. In one legal 
relationship between the parent and child, the state is highly involved, 
arranging financial support, custody, and support, with joint custody being 
ordered more frequently.50 The second legal relationship, the spouse-to-
spouse or adult-to-adult (non-marital) relationship, is only loosely tied to the 
first.51 
In this second legal relationship, as Witte notes, the reigning ideology 
posits that marriage is a contract of convenience between autonomous, 
independent partners on equal footing.52 The partners select marriage when 
each of them concludes that his or her best interests, including needs for love 
and belonging, will be satisfied by the contract and it is relatively easy to 
dissolve if these needs continue not to be satisfied.   
However, it would be a mistake to suppose that this modern ideology 
about marriage actually governs the family in practice. The state still supplies 
most of the legal default rules for marriage: prohibiting certain marriages; 
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51 For an interesting proposal for legal change, see Merle H. Weiner, Regulating the 
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imposing legal duties of support on spouses during marriage through the 
“necessities” doctrine; and supplying most of the rules for divorce on matters 
such as child custody, visitation, child and spousal support, as well as spousal 
division of property.53 While more states are permitting couples to bargain 
over these aspects through agreements before, during, and even at the end of 
marriage, the law still imposes a heavy hand on agreements that are 
considered coercive, extremely unequal, or otherwise against public policy.54 
Just as an example, few, if any, states will permit a parent to bargain his way 
out of child support with the other parent’s agreement or a spouse to bargain 
his way out of supporting his indigent spouse. 55 So, society lives with some 
kind of amalgam of the Reformation paradigm and what John Witte calls the 
modern or contractarian paradigm. 
V. LUTHERAN THEOLOGICAL VIEWS OF FAMILY 
 The assumptions of this modern ideology of family law, however, 
confound most of the lessons of Lutheran theology about the nature and role 
of the family. First among them is an understanding of the structural role of 
God’s creative orderings of marriage and family in the preservation of the 
world. Much of the current family law ideology is premised on the 
assumption that families are sui generis creations of the individuals who 
                                                          
53 See Jill Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STANFORD L. REV. 825, 835–39 (2004) 
(describing some of the ways in which marriage continues to be a “status” relationship 
governed by law rather than a contractual undertaking, including the refusal of states to 
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provide “necessities” for his or her spouse). 
54 See ELLMAN, supra note 29, at 809–10, 819–20, 885–86 (discussing the Uniform 
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55 See Richard G. Vogl, Waiving Child Support, 44 ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Apr. 2002 6, 8 
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make them up, artifacts of human creativity much like a painting or a car 
design. While there is a case to be made that the nature and ethos of families 
is in part constituted by the creative work of those in each family, for 
Lutherans, the family itself, or more broadly the household of Luther’s 
time,56 has a more structural role to play in the social fabric.  
Central to any understanding of the family’s calling is the very real 
vulnerability of the human child, whose rearing in the fear and love of God, 
Luther thought, was the chief purpose of marriage.57 Children are not only 
physically vulnerable to the threats that parents worry about such as being 
hurt by a car to being kidnapped and killed by a stranger. Especially in 
modern, mobile capitalist societies where a person is a member of many 
communities simultaneously and throughout their lifetime, children are 
economically vulnerable (how do they meet their basic needs when they can’t 
get a job until they’re 16?) and socially vulnerable (how will the communities 
in which they grow receive them?). Moreover, the Reformers, like us, 
recognized that children were educationally vulnerable: they needed the skills 
necessary to make their way in the world, and they needed the moral 
education that would allow them to fulfill their vocations to others in this 
secular age.58   
In the modern age, children are also religiously vulnerable, sometimes 
in very dramatic ways. Even in the mid-20th century, when I grew up in a 
household in which each of us pursued our individual interests and our family 
moved from state to state, our constants were table prayers and bedtime 
                                                          
56 For an argument for returning to the use of the Reformation concept of household as the 
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prayers, Lutheran day school, Sunday worship, Sunday school, vacation 
Bible school, and the examples of parents and other adults to mold us as 
Christians. Today, most modern American children can count on only a few 
of these supports for their growth into religious maturity. The one-parent 
family, and even the two-parent family, is a structure too overloaded to 
support children as they travel through the challenges of childhood and 
adolescence. 
 It is easy to make a parallel, if not identical, argument about the 
vulnerability of adults in families, both marital and non-marital. To be sure, 
a family consisting of an intimate childless couple, or two brothers living 
together, has a history of experience that is different from a family in which 
parents are taking care of their children. Yet, the basic needs of human beings, 
from the need for human love and touch to the need for partnership in the 
tasks of survival, are universal. Most, though not all, human beings reach for 
communities of human intimacy, whether emotional or physical or spiritual, 
at some time in their lives.59  
 Given that these different relationships create human vulnerabilities 
within each family, I would argue that Lutheran theology breaks with those 
who are arguing for a return to a more pristine version of the nuclear family 
as the paradigmatic, or only, family to be recognized for legal protection. As 
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noted, the traditional Protestant approach to marriage would object to 
valorizing the family as an ultimate spiritual good or a sacrament. Even so, it 
is very easy for Protestants advocating for a return to tradition to come close 
to suggesting that the nuclear family is the DNA of human existence, without 
which it is impossible to imagine meaningful human community. 
VI. THE CREATOR GOD REMAKES THE FAMILY 
It is easy to understand this nostalgia for the nuclear family, since 
forming marriages and having children is one of the most recurring and 
consistent experiences of human communities, existing across cultures and 
history. But in valorizing the nuclear family as the ideal family, Lutherans 
see the potential seeds for idolatry. For Luther, marriage was not to be 
idolized as an oasis against the real world. It was an imperfect remedy (a 
“hospital for the sick,” he called it) for some of the real-world harms that 
result in conditions of sin.60 Like all things co-created by God and humans, 
marriage and the family are social institutions that bring great joy and 
goodness; but they are all thoroughly infected with sin, incapable of 
perfection, and the site of continuing human tragedy. Failing to understand 
and acknowledge that there is no ideal family compared to which all other 
family forms are broken is a first step for Lutherans toward forgetting where 
not just their salvation, but also their flourishing really lies: in humans’ 
relationship with the Triune God. The family (real or ideal) is a false god, 
whether real or imagined, and a god that will betray its members every time.  
 Second, valorizing the nuclear family (or any family form, including 
the mother-child dyad) as the central and unchangeable form of human 
community gives the lie to the very essence of God as a continual Creator. 
While Lutherans understand all too keenly that God absconds from human 
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attempts at such a definition, they can and must affirm that God is directly 
involved in always changing the family as an order of creation in God’s 
continuing work to shape the creation so that human beings can flourish in 
their present circumstances. There is no reason to think that while Lutherans 
affirm the changes wrought by the creating hand of God all around our world, 
from our ever-taller and more colorful human race to the creation (and 
extinction) of new species, the family has been exempted from that 
continuously creating power.  
Indeed, history and sociology tell us that the makeup of the family 
varies widely in diverse times and places, from the large household model of 
biologically related members, students, friends, and guests, to temporary 
households of two persons.61 So, as Lutherans reaffirm that the family is not 
our own personal creation but given by God’s hand, they must also reaffirm 
the power and prerogative of God to change the created order, or orders, of 
the family to those that permit human beings to flourish and to be blessed.   
 From another angle of vision, Lutherans understand that membership 
in the family is one of their callings from God to serve their neighbor. 
Neighbor is not the opposite of family, a threatening outsider compared with 
the family imagined as an association in which we are safe, and to whom we 
owe our ultimate loyalty. In the Lutheran perspective, the neighbor is a more 
comprehensive term for the Other; and those in our family are a subset, albeit 
a distinctive subset, of those who are our neighbors. Three salient points 
worth repeating are contained in this Lutheran idea of callings in the family. 
First, God is continuously calling human beings, whether they acknowledge 
God or not, to their families. Families are not personal inventions. Second, 
people’s roles in their own families are to serve each other, matching each 
one’s distinctive gifts to the others’ distinctive needs, rather than using or 
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misusing others toward one’s own desired ends. Third, God’s call to service 
is precisely aimed toward creating concrete conditions for human flourishing 
in this life, which will always, inevitably and tragically, be infected with 
human limitation and sin.  
It also bears re-emphasis that God does not just call each of us human 
beings to our families, but that God calls each family, and each person in 
them, to the world. Remember the Reformers’ expectation that families or 
households were called and were given the strengths and means to take in the 
widow, the wayfarer, and the destitute person. This was not an altruistic or 
supererogatory expectation, it was just as much a calling as the calling to their 
family members. The modern introspective view of the family, one that 
suggests that adult members should be spending all their time and wealth on 
children or spouses or turn their backs on others’ problems to take care of 
those in our own families, has it exactly backwards. Taking in neighborhood 
children for pizza or showing up to pack meals for the poor is as much “family 
time,” in the Lutheran understanding, as the family vacation or the nightly 
bedtime ritual. 
What is the role of secular law, part of the political order of creation, 
in this construction? Secular law employs the power of the state to prevent, 
deter, and punish the evil that human sin causes, and to ameliorate it to the 
extent possible. It does so through both restraining and affirmative acts of 
government, which Lutheran doctrine has recognized from the beginning.62  
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Thus, secular law is an important opportunity for citizens in a 
democratic society, and our legal representatives in government, to exercise 
our roles as co-creators with God in constructing law that will enable each 
family, no matter its composition, to flourish. First, we need to think 
collectively about what family forms are capable of producing trustworthy 
relationships of human flourishing shored up by a state that expects us to 
accept our callings as members of families. Treating the creation of families 
as simply a contractual matter between two adults who have children together 
does not respect the conditions of sin in which selfishness and power 
imbalances can distort the equity that healthy families require. 
Certainly, citizens exercising their rational and moral faculties can 
have diverse political views about the benefits and problems with various 
forms of state intervention, whether they take the form of regulation and 
management of, or financial subsidies to, the family. But whatever the 
appropriate role of the state is, these legal protections and benefits need to be 
extended to all forms of family that provide this nurturance. Thus, for 
example, it makes sense that the state should recognize the duties of family 
members to provide basic economic support to each other, regardless of 
whether they are nuclear or not. Similarly, there is no reason, at least in 
theory, why siblings, grandparents, and grandchildren, or other 
configurations of family cannot receive the hundreds of state benefits and 
protections that married couple families currently receive: from Social 
Security death benefits, welfare payments, and medical assistance, to rights 
to visit family members in the hospital, or to receive property inheritances in 
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death. The extension of marriage to same-sex couples in the United States 
has eliminated many of those problems for them, but not for the other kinds 
of families. Those “nontraditional” families still need to spend money and 
considerable time to even come close to replicating many of the legal 
protections and benefits taken for granted by the marital nuclear family. 
To be sure, it may not always be easy to delineate the difference 
between a “real” family and a collection of people who temporarily live under 
the same roof. However, American courts have some experience trying to 
define these factors as some have attempted to extend some of the protections 
of married couples to informal families. For example, in Braschi v. Stahl 
Associates, the court was faced with deciding whether a gay life-partner 
should be allowed to stay in his partner’s rent-controlled apartment, a 
privilege granted only to family members under New York City law.63 The 
court listed a number of factors in making the decision that the surviving 
partner was legally considered “family,” including the longevity of the 
couple’s relationship, how exclusive it was, and whether the couple held 
themselves out as a family to others and were treated as such by extended 
family members.64 The Court also looked at whether the partners 
commingled their income and assets, held property together, jointly paid 
debts of the household, gave each other power of attorney, were listed as 
beneficiaries on life insurance, and so forth.65 Similarly, states that have 
recognized common law marriages over time have had to identify and apply 
a number of factors to decide whether a couple that has not chosen to 
solemnize their marriage should nevertheless be treated as a legal family. 
Criteria for identifying which households are families and which are not 
families may vary from state to state, but they are not impossible to formulate.   
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Alternatively, as noted, many states and countries have in recent years 
offered the opportunity for couples, or some others, to identify themselves as 
family by registering as domestic partners to obtain at least some of the rights 
and benefits automatically granted to married people.66 This procedure 
recognizes families in situations in which partners agree to responsibilities to 
each other, but again, it does not go far enough; it does not resolve the rights 
of non-marital partners where one refuses to record a partnership or enter a 
marriage because he or she is too selfish to share his income and assets with 
his partner or a member of his family.   
Second, we need to think about whether current American family law 
adequately holds even married persons accountable for sustaining 
relationships of reliance and trust that they have built over time with spouses. 
In the Lutheran view, our service to our neighbor is a demand by God that 
we cannot ignore, and no less when that neighbor is a member of our family. 
Three states, Louisiana, Arizona, and Arkansas, have attempted to recognize 
these responsibilities by co-mingling traditional religious and modern secular 
ideas about marriage in covenant marriage.67 Couples must freely choose this 
form of marriage, but do not need to do so. If they make this choice, they are 
required to get premarital counseling before they can be legally wed and must 
show that they obtained marital counseling before they divorce. Covenant 
marriage waiting periods before divorces are final and generally longer than 
for no-fault divorces, and a person divorcing in a covenant marriage must 
show a listed “fault” as a basis for divorce, i.e., adultery, commission of a 
felony, or physical or sexual abuse of either the spouse or children. Separation 
over a lengthy period of time is another ground for divorce recognized in 
covenant marriage jurisdictions.68  
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Whether covenant marriage is a salutary development in theory or 
not, only a small number of couples have opted for covenant marriage and 
there is no evidence that covenant marriage has slowed the rate of divorce in 
states where it is an option. Those who argue against a return to fault-based 
divorce note that there are downsides; not the least of which is the financial 
and emotional trauma that families face in a contested fault divorce. They 
point out that, while divorce rates rose when no-fault divorce was instituted, 
“domestic violence rates fell by approximately 20-30 percent and wives’ 
suicide rates fell by 8-13 percent.”69 
Even without a return to fault-based divorce, the requirements in 
some states that couples seek counseling intervention or attempt to mediate 
their divorce if reconciliation is not possible may be a welcome development 
if these requirements are managed effectively.70 As an example, some states, 
such as Minnesota, give a financial break on marriage licenses to those who 
have obtained premarital counseling, as a way of incentivizing thoughtful 
entrance into marriage instead of restricting or preventing it.71   
Just as importantly, for marriages that are indeed so broken that 
members of the family are being irreparably harmed by their continuation, 
secular law must ensure a just and adequate accounting on behalf of all 
parties. To be sure, clarity in the delineation of rights and duties, both about 
property and about things like custody, support, and visitation, is important 
to avoid further incidents of high conflict. And it may be true that a married 
couple’s emotional journey through divorce has to include some ritualized 
sense of the ending of the marriage. However, the modern concept of family 
law that the affairs of the family should, as much as possible, be wound up in 
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the divorce decree belies the fact that most married or unmarried couples and 
their children are always in relationships, albeit different relationships, after 
divorce, so any “final decree” also needs to account for the past and the future 
as well as the moment of divorce.  
In recent years, many states have moved in the direction of providing 
a more adequate accounting of the past of the couple in the division of assets 
and family income. For example, in recognition of the differing contributions 
of both husbands and wives to marriage, more states now use a strict 50-50 
split, or equitable division rule, regardless of who earned the money for those 
assets or holds legal title to them, and even regardless of who may have been 
at fault in the divorce.72 More states have attempted to make more equitable 
property awards to spouses who have supported their husbands or wives 
through school, only to have the supported spouse desert them right at the 
time they would have reaped the rewards of the partnership.73 Similarly, as 
mentioned, many states have accounted for the difficulties faced by long-time 
caregivers or disabled spouses by awarding larger property settlements, 
rehabilitative alimony, or even in some cases permanent alimony where the 
special needs of one spouse warrants it.74  
Even so, these awards often fall short of a just solution, whether they 
look backwards to acknowledge the contributions that each spouse made to 
the marriage, or forward to the ongoing needs of each member of the family 
and the relative ability of both spouses to earn a decent living and meet their 
children’s expenses. As just one example, there has been significant litigation 
over whether an objecting wealthy non-custodial father should be legally 
forced to pay for college for his children over 18, or whether the custodial 
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parent is essentially stuck with the responsibility of making sure her children 
get a college education.75     
Lutheran theology would argue that justice and the needs of both 
spouses and children are more important considerations than autonomy in 
dividing family assets. Again, Lutherans would argue that it is not a 
supererogatory act of a saint when a parent goes beyond meeting his 
children’s or ex-spouse’s minimal needs. Rather, it is an expectation of that 
person’s calling to one who has relied on him and who is vulnerable, and such 
an expectation can thus be legally imposed.   
Perhaps the most critical issue that Lutherans face in the area of 
modern family law is to reconsider whether the law should spell out any 
relationship between sexuality, marriage, and family in an era in which social 
mores and the availability of contraception have uncoupled the relationship 
between sexuality, marriage, and children. One of the reasons the law has 
begun to respond to the needs of non-marital partners and their families is 
that there are so many more of them now. A 2014 Pew Center study found 
that the share of unmarried American adults is at a historic high, one in five 
adults ages 25 and older (and 23% of men), compared to half that percentage 
in 1960.76 A quarter of these unmarried adults 25-34 live with a partner, and 
almost half of all married people cohabit before they get married.77 In 2014, 
40% of births were to unmarried mothers, a slight decline from the 41% share 
from 2008-2013.78 For the most part, criminal law has abandoned enforcing 
any expectations about sexuality and reproduction, with the exception of 
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children or disabled adults who are protected because they are not deemed 
capable of consent. As suggested, civil law too has moved in the direction of 
treating individuals who make sexual or reproductive choices outside of 
marriage more like marital partners in terms of rights and responsibilities, 
though at a slow pace. Given their theological presuppositions, Lutherans 
face a number of challenges as they consider whether society can accept, as 
an adaptation of God’s creative ordering, a social structure in which sexuality 
and procreation are uncoupled from marriage. Lutherans, like many other 
Christians, continue to grapple with the question that still lingers after 
Obergefell, whether marriage is by its nature defined by biological 
complementarity, or whether God is doing a new thing in creating marriages 
not defined as heterosexual in essence. They must ask whether they can 
affirm a mother-child dyad, in which a father or second parent is either 
literally or essentially absent, as a socially and legally equivalent form of 
family that can provide the same security, pedagogy, and human community 
as families with two parents. They must ask whether, from the perspective of 
the state charged with protecting children, there is any essential legal 
difference between biological parents, or those adults now recognized by 
some courts to be psychological, or de facto, parents of the children they have 
raised, particularly in cases where psychological parents are fighting 
biological parents for custody. 
CONCLUSION 
All of these questions about families and family law push hard on 
Lutherans to confirm their original witness that God is creatively ordering 
human lives on this earth as a partner with human beings in human 
institutions. The Lutheran tradition calls for Christians to trust and challenge 
human institutions, acknowledging that they are a place of God’s activity in 
the world, just as much as churches. That tradition reminds Lutherans that 




Christians and non-Christians alike bear the mark of God’s goodness in their 
ability to reason about the institutions that create trust and permit human 
flourishing in the world, and that the institution of secular law is also infected 
by human limitation and sin, no more or no less than God’s other creative 
orderings, such as the Church and the family. That reality makes it possible 
for Lutheran citizens to go forth in resolving these very difficult issues with 
others from different religious traditions or none, from different 
communities, and nations, because they have faith that they can trust God’s 
blessing on their labors. 
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